I. Static Games of Complete Information 1.Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium 2.Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties
II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information 3.Extensive-Form Games 4.Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions 5.Repeated Games
III. Static Games of Incomplete Information 6.Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium 7.Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 8.Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection 9.Reputation Effects 10.Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete
V. Advanced Topics 11.More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance 12.Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games 13.Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov 14.Common Knowledge and Games