PART 1: ECONOMIC AGENTS CHAPTER 1: CONSUMER THEORY 1.1 Primitive Notions 1.2 Preferences and Utility 1.3 The Consumer's Problem 1.4 Indirect Utility and Expenditure 1.5 Properties of Consumer Demand 1.6 Exercises
CHAPTER 2: TOPICS IN CONSUMER THEORY 2.1 Duality: A Closer Look 2.2 Integrability 2.3 Revealed Preference 2.4 Uncertainty 2.5 Exercises
CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF THE FIRM 3.1 Primitive Notions 3.2 Production 3.3 Cost 3.4 Duality in Production 3.5 The Competitive Firm 3.6 Exercises
PART 2: MARKETS AND WELFARE CHAPTER 4: PARTIAL EQUALIBRIUM 4.1 Perfect Competition 4.2 Imperfect Competition 4.3 Equilibrium and Welfare 4.4 Exercises
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL EQUALIBRIUM 5.1 Equilibrium in Exchange 5.2 Equilibrium in Competitive Market Systems 5.3 Equilibrium in Production 5.4 Contingent Plans 5.5 Core and Equilibria 5.6 Exercises
CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 6.1 The Nature of the Problem 6.2 Social Choice and Arrow's Theorem 6.3 Measurability, Comparability, and Some Possibilities 6.4 Justice 6.5 Social Choice and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 6.6 Exercises
PART 3: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR CHAPTER 7: GAME THEORY 7.1 Strategic Decision Making 7.2 Strategic Form Games 7.3 Extensive Form Games 7.4 Exercises
CHAPTER 8: INFORMATION ECONOMICS 8.1 Adverse Selection 8.2 Moral Hazard and the Principal-Agent Problem 8.3 Information and Market Performance 8.4 Exercises
CHAPTER 9: AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN 9.1 The Four Standard Auctions 9.2 The Independent Private Values Model 9.3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 9.4 Designing a Revenue Maximising Mechanism 9.5 Designing Allocatively Efficient Mechanisms 9.6 Exercises
MATHEMATICAL APPENDICES CHAPTER A1: SETS AND MAPPINGS A1.1 Elements of Logic A1.2 Elements of Set Theory A1.3 A Little Topology A1.4 Real-Valued Functions A1.5 Exercises