I. Static Games of Complete Information
1.Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
2.Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and Properties

II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3.Extensive-Form Games
4.Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
5.Repeated Games

III. Static Games of Incomplete Information
6.Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
7.Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design

IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
8.Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection
9.Reputation Effects
10.Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete

V. Advanced Topics
11.More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
12.Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
13.Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov
14.Common Knowledge and Games