Preface

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Lists of Symbols

Introduction 1

1 The subject and objectives of the research 1

2 Refinement of concepts 4

3 The state of the art 9

4 The research outline 20

5 The methodology 23

Pt. I Oligopolistic Vertical Integration With Symmetric Objectives 27

Ch. 1 Vertical Integration in a Successive Duopoly with Fixed Proportions of Inputs 29

1 Introduction 29

2 A basic successive duopoly model 29

3 The analytical framework 31

4 Some preliminary results 49

5 Conclusions 58

Ch. 2 Vertical Integration in a Cournot Successive Oligopoly 59

1 Introduction 59

2 Horizontal market structure and generic vertical industrial structures 60

3 The degree of vertical integration and equilibria in mixed integration games 71

4 Profit incentives and endogeneity of vertical industrial structure 87

5 Conclusions 98

Ch. 3 Vertical Integration in a Differentiated Duopoly 101

1 A model of successive Cournot duopoly with product differentiation 101

2 Equilibrium analysis 103

3 Product differentiation and equilibrium vertical structure 109

4 Conclusions 117

Ch. 4 Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Variable Proportions of Intermediate Inputs 119

1 Introduction 119

2 A basic framework 120

3 Equilibrium analysis 122

4 Pre-integration vertical structure and the consequence of vertical integration 132

5 Conclusions 137

Appendix 4.1. Derivation of the derived demand elasticity in the supply contracts game 140

Pt. II Oligopolistic Vertical Integration With Asymmetric Objectives 143

Ch. 5 Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Asymmetric Objectives 145

1 Introduction 145

2 A model of mixed successive oligopoly 146

3 Equilibrium analysis 153

4 Major findings 184

5 Conclusions 206

General Conclusions 209

References 215

Index 225

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Lists of Symbols

Introduction 1

1 The subject and objectives of the research 1

2 Refinement of concepts 4

3 The state of the art 9

4 The research outline 20

5 The methodology 23

Pt. I Oligopolistic Vertical Integration With Symmetric Objectives 27

Ch. 1 Vertical Integration in a Successive Duopoly with Fixed Proportions of Inputs 29

1 Introduction 29

2 A basic successive duopoly model 29

3 The analytical framework 31

4 Some preliminary results 49

5 Conclusions 58

Ch. 2 Vertical Integration in a Cournot Successive Oligopoly 59

1 Introduction 59

2 Horizontal market structure and generic vertical industrial structures 60

3 The degree of vertical integration and equilibria in mixed integration games 71

4 Profit incentives and endogeneity of vertical industrial structure 87

5 Conclusions 98

Ch. 3 Vertical Integration in a Differentiated Duopoly 101

1 A model of successive Cournot duopoly with product differentiation 101

2 Equilibrium analysis 103

3 Product differentiation and equilibrium vertical structure 109

4 Conclusions 117

Ch. 4 Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Variable Proportions of Intermediate Inputs 119

1 Introduction 119

2 A basic framework 120

3 Equilibrium analysis 122

4 Pre-integration vertical structure and the consequence of vertical integration 132

5 Conclusions 137

Appendix 4.1. Derivation of the derived demand elasticity in the supply contracts game 140

Pt. II Oligopolistic Vertical Integration With Asymmetric Objectives 143

Ch. 5 Vertical Integration in a Successive Oligopoly with Asymmetric Objectives 145

1 Introduction 145

2 A model of mixed successive oligopoly 146

3 Equilibrium analysis 153

4 Major findings 184

5 Conclusions 206

General Conclusions 209

References 215

Index 225